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ECONOMIC HONORS:
An Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment and
Portfolio Investment into Developing Countries

Sunaina Kilachand
February 28,1996

Introduction:

Since 1989, there has been a large increase in capital flows to developing
countries. There are three striking features of the nature of this current surge of
capital flows. Firstly, although private capital flows have been increasing since
1986, these flows, they accelerated when interest rates began to fall. 1 The fall in
interest rates led investors to seek higher returns in other markets which was
further motivated by the fact that the creditworthiness of developing countries
had increased due to this fall in interest rates. Secondly, the increase in the
private capital flows did not occur in all developing countries. The majority of
private capital went to East Asia and Latin America, and even then the amounts
and type of these flows for each country was very different. 2 The regions
receiving a continuous renewed flows were countries that had recently
implemented structural reforms, which shows the importance of domestic
factors. Thirdly, in the economic history of developing countries, different types
of external capital have been prominent at different points in time. Due to post
Cold War strategies, foreign aid programs were more dominant in the 1950's. In
the 1960's and early 1970's, foreign direct investment (FDI) came to be the
dominant source of external finance, which governments came to view as a
potential threat to their sovereignty. This tied into the dependency theories at the
time which holds "that external factors are responsible for the distortions that
characterize the economies of the developing world." 3 This led to
1 Leonardo Hernandez and Heinz Rudolph, Sustainability of Private Capital Flows to Developing
countries: Is a Generalized Reversal likely? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994)p. 4
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Ibid.

Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing
COllntries (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 16-18
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nationalization and expropriation concerns on the part of multinational
corporations (MNC's) and FDI trickled off in the 1970's, leading to the increased
importance of external debt. 4 In the wake of the 1980 debt crisis, the composition
of private capital inflows shifted considerably, with FDI and portfolio
investment (PFI) replacing debt flows. Commercial banks were increasingly
reluctant to undertake any loans to developing countries due to the risk of
default. In the past few years, portfolio investment has increased rapidly,
constituting more than one fifth of all capital inflows into developing countries. s

FDI and portfolio investment have come to playa dominant role in financing
decisions of developing countries.
Examining the flows in Appendix #1, one observes significant differences
in the composition of capital inflows. While certain countries like Brazil, Chile
and Mexico have had a large amount of portfolio (PFI) flows in the last few
years, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have had large amounts of
foreign direct investment (FDI). Today, at a time when most developing
countries are still greatly indebted, a large reversal of flows could be very
detrimental to host economies and threaten their economic reform process.
The recent Mexican crisis last December after the devaluation of the peso,
which coincided with an increase in international interest rates, leads to the
question of the sustainability, the mix and the nature of these capital flows, and
appropriate policy responses to avoid large external outflows of capital. While
the crisis was triggered off by a series of political events (such as the
assassinations of two political leaders and the peasant uprising), capital inflows
Bret L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: Discontent in the Developing World
(Westport. Connecticut and London: Praeger. 1993)
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MasQod Ahmed aud Sudarshan Gooptu, "Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries", Finance
and Development. March 1993, p.9
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to Mexico at the time of the crisis consisted mainly of portfolio investment
(PFI)as opposed to FOI. In light of these concerns, it is necessary to examine and
understand the nature of the two main components of capital inflows to
developing countries, i.e. PFI and FOI flows.
This paper attempts to understand what motivates and determines
private capital inflows in developing counties. I intend to examine whether
different types of flows (in this paper I will focus only on FOI and PFI as they
dominate private investment flows today) depend on different factors, whether
these factors are domestic or international and which of these factors are within
the scope and reach of the host developing countries. In my paper, after
providing some background information on FOI and PFI , I will then review
previous studies and work based on the subject ofFOI and PFr flows. I will go
on to construct and empirically test structural models of FOI and PFI, and
proceed with an empirical analysis. Based on these findings, I hope to be able to
identify which factors a country should pay close attention to according to the
individual composition of their capital inflows, and then examine appropriate
policy responses to avoid a shock resulting from large, sudden outflows.

Background:

• Foreign Direct Investment:
By International Monetary Fund (IMP) standards, FOI consists of the sum
of (1) new equity purchased or acquired by parent companies in overseas firms
they are considered to control (including establishment of new subsidiaries), (2)
reinvestment of earnings by controlled firms, and (3) intracompany loans from
parent companies to controlled firms. 6 FOI is therefore, the acquisition by a firm
Edward M.Graham and· Paul R. Krugman, .. The Surge in Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980's",
Foreign Direct Investment (Chicago and London: The Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 15-16.
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in one country of control over business activity in a second country. FDI has been
a subject of interest for a long time. In the 1960's developing countries absorbed
40% of international FDI flows; during the 1970's, this figure fell to around one
7

third of the world tota1. During the 1960's FDI accounted for over half of all the
private capital flows to developing countries, but by the late 1970's FDI
represented barely one quarter of these flows, which comprised mainly of banklending or export credits. International bank lending averaged 36% of financial
flows was in the late 70's and early 80'S.6 Beginning with Mexico in 1982, many
developing countries experienced severe problems in servicing their debt. As a
result, international bank lending fell to only 19%, whereas, FDI flows to
developing countries over the same period remained constant at around 11% of
net financial flows. 7 After the debt crisis, commercial bank lending was no
longer a viable option for many developing countries, as a result FDI has come
to play an increasingly important role for such countries. In 1990, FDI flows to
developing countries reached a total of US$ 32 billion, continuing the growth in
inflows that began in the late 1980's. 8 From 1988-1995, MNC's have tripled their
annual investment in developing countries to an estimated US$90 billion this
year. According to the 1995 World Investment Report, business growth
prospects have increased more rapidly in Asia and Latin America, than in the
U.s., Japan and Western Europe.
Within these global trends, direct investment patterns in individual
countries have differed greatly according to differences in the economic
7

UNIDO. Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries, ( United Nations: 1990)

6 See Cynthia Day Wallace and contributors, Foreign Direct Investment in the 1990's: A new Climate in
the Third World (Dodrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990). p.5
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UNCTC, World Investment Report, (New York: United Nations, 1982) p.22
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environment and governmental policies. FOI flows have been unequally
distributed among developing countries, as one can see in Appendix # 1. Much
of FOI appears to be concentrated in countries that have large domestic markets,
are rich in natural resources, or have significant advantages as a base for exportoriented production. Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Singapore and Malaysia
accounted for half the stock of FOI flows in non-oil developing countries.

9

Countries with small markets, and low levels of natural resources were not very
successful in attracting FOI even with a large number of incentives.
With the increasing importance of FOI flows to developing countries,
there has been considerable controversy about the relative costs and benefits
associated with an FOI inflow. The argument for FOI mainly is that the capital
and technological resource transfer increase the real domestic income of the host
country by more than the profits of the investor. 10 Other indirect benefits
include longer-term increased productivity and international competitiveness,
technology transfer and an improved level of training and experience within the
work force. As a result of the debt crisis, many developing countries have
needed foreign exchange and debt-service relief. Through debt-equity swaps,
FOI has provided can provide new capital and promoted export earrtings. The
main objection to high levels of FOI is that it is associated with a large degree of
overseas control which can have a significant impact on the economy of the host
country and as a result might lead to restrictive policies on the part of the host
government. Judgments on the acceptable degree of foreign ownership must be
individually determined by each host government on the basis of individual
needs and objectives. The policies that are most likely to affect the level of FOI
See International Monetary Fund, Foreign Private Investment in Developing Countries: A Study by the
Research Department. (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1985)pp.4-5
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JO Ibid.
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into a country, are macroeconomic policies. Fiscal and monetary policies, if
adopted to increase financial stability are likely to have a positive effect on FDI
flows, as would the reduction of regulations concerning the entry of investors
and the repatriation of their profits. l1 Although the net benefits of attracting FDI
may be different for each individual country, FDI can be of mutual benefit to
both the host country and the investor, if the right policies and steps are adopted
by both parties.

• Portfolio investment:
Portfolio investment flows into developing countries, as distinct from FDI,
comprises of financial instruments that can be obtained by foreign investors
either in the international securities markets, U.S. private placement markets, or
direct purchases from the developing country's stock markets. The instruments
can be classified into;12
Equity Instruments: Equity instruments include the following:

Country Funds: These allow foreign investors to pool resources and
invest in the emerging stock markets in, for example, Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, etc. These usually take the form of closed-end funds
which make an initial share offering for public trading, but are not
redeemable, unless sold to another individual at a price that may not
necessarily reflect its true market price, or if it is transferred into an openend fund which can issue and redeem shares according to investor
demand. Country funds used to be the only permitted instrument for
foreign investors in previous years. However, their importance has
II

Ibid. p.J I.

12 Masood Ahmed and Sudarshan Gooptu, "Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries",
Finance and Development, March 1993, p.ll
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declined as many developing countries have relaxed restrictions on
foreign equity investments.
ADR's: American Depository Receipts: These are negotiable equity-based
instruments, issued by a non-U.S. corporation, publicly traded in the U.S.
securities markets and backed by a trust containing shares of the
corporation. ADR holders have the same rights as if they hold the
underlying shares. Unlike the country funds, these have grown in
importance, mainly due to the adoption of SEC Rule 144A , which allows
this instrument to be used by smaller investors.
GDR's: Global Depository Receipts: These are similar to ADR's, but can
be issued in securities exchanges all over the world.
Direct Equity Purchase by Foreign Investors: These, where permitted by
developing country governments, are increasingly important in attracting
resources from abroad.

Debt Instruments: These include the following types of financial instruments:
International Bond Issues: These have been a significant feature of
developing country financing for many decades, but were displaced by
the large increase in bank loans in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Bond
issues now constitute a large proportion of portfolio investment.
Commercial Paper: Short-term instruments that are issued by entities in
developing countries in the Euromarkets and the United States.
Certificates of Deposit: (CD's) These have been used by developing
countries to raise resources in the international markets.
Until recently portfolio investment flows have been of little significance to
most developing countries, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, due to excessive
restrictions imposed by countries on foreign capital flows, underdeveloped
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securities markets, instability of the macroeconomic environment such as sudden
drastic devaluations and resulting exchange losses.
As these obstacles have begun to decrease over the past few years,
portfolio investment flows have become the fastest growing form of external
finance to developing countries, amounting to one fifth of all capital flows to the
developing world. 13 Portfolio investment flows increased from $7.6 billion in
1989 to $20.3 billion in 1991. This recent surge in portfolio investment is
important for a number of reasons. Firstly, these flows indicate the return to
market financing after the decade of the debt crisis. These flows also imply
important structural changes, such as the growing importance of institutional
investors as a source of long-term finance. Increase in portfolio investment flows
also highlights the trend of developing countries moving away from public
sector borrowing to more private sector capital and funds.
Although, Portfolio flows have increased dramatically in the past few
years, the flows have been mainly concentrated in a few developing countries,
primarily in Asia and Latin America. 14 Much of the initial growth in portfolio
investment was financed by returning flight capital, but this small group of
domestic investors has been joined a much more powerful group of institutional
investors. Global institutional investors are attracted to developing countries
stock markets, even though these are risky, in order to diversify their portfolio,
and reduce total portfolio risk. Other investors include managed investment
funds, foreign banks and brokerage firms and retail clients of Eurobond houses.
The reasons behind the recent surge in portfolio investment are diverse.
Some feel that it is the effect of the unusually low U.S. interest rates, explaining
13

Ibid. p.9

14 Peter J. West, "Latin America's Return to the Private International Capital Market", Cepa/
Review,Vol.44, August 1991 : 69
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that the boom in portfolio flows coincided with the fall in U.s. interest rates.
Others argue that economic reforms in many developing countries have
drastically improved the investment climate of the host countries. lS Also,
stabilization policies have reduced fear of creditworthiness and stability of the
developing countries governments. The true answer lies in a combination of the
two arguments. While lower US interest rates definitely caused investors
searching for high-yield instruments to go to the emerging markets abroad, they
also contributed to increasing the credit-worthiness of many developing
countries as it provided debt-servicing relief by reducing their burdens.
This dramatic surge in portfolio flows has important policy considerations
for developing countries. At the macroeconomic level, the main issue is how to
handle the effects of such large capital inflows and the possibility of equally
sudden outflows in terms of real exchange rate fluctuations or monetary
implications of changes is reserve levels. For the most part, policymakers in
developing countries tend to regard these flows as temporary. As a result,
countries have tried to limit the extent of real appreciation by intervening in the
foreign exchange market, or issuing domestic debt. Policymakers also are
worried about the effect of a sudden withdrawal ofinvestment on the domestic
stock markets. In order to handle the sudden withdrawal of PFI, a country must
have better accounting practices, more stringent regulations and closer
monitoring of stock markets. Also, the Mexican crisis highlights the need for an
appropriate policy response to prevent against future recurrences in the form of
sudden outflows of PFI. Thus, portfolio investment can have important
consequences for a host country's economy, and it is necessary to better

" Masood Ahmed and Sudarshan Gooptu, "Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries" .
Finance and Development. March 1993, p.11
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understand what factors drive PFI so that one may be able to identify
appropriate policy responses for developing country governments .

• Comparison of FDI and Portfolio Investment:
The basic difference between direct investment and portfolio investment
is that, in the case of the former, the investor seeks to secure a permanent and
effective share in the management of the enterprise in which the investments are
made, whereas in that of the latter case the investors do not seek management
control. 16 It is necessary to distinguish between FDI and portfolio investment, as
there are significant differences in both the characteristics and motives of the
respective investors. Portfolio investment is generally carried out by individual
investors, or increasingly often, by institutional investors. When determining the
composition of their portfolio, these investors are guided solely by
considerations of risk and profitability. FDI is made by big enterprises and
corporations, producing goods and services. An FDI investor takes into account
not only risks and profit opportunities, but also apprises the macroeconomic
environment of the country. FDI investors are concerned more with long term
returns, access to global markets, taking advantage of cheaper labor and
exploiting their technological advantages. Both FDI and portfolio investment, in
the recent years have come to occupy a large proportion of capital inflows to the
developing world. However, these are two very different forms of investment
that may respond to different economic factors, and have very different impacts
on the host economies. Investors of FDI are more likely to be concerned with
domestic host country factors which provide for a favorable long-term
investment climate. PFI investors on the other hand are guided solely by shortterm profits, and thus are likely to make decisions on the basis of the difference
16 Peter J. West. "Latin America·s Return to the Private International Capital Markee·. Cepal
Review.VoI.44. August 1991: 69
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between short-term rates of return. As a result, PFI investors could be guided by
factors such as international interest rates that are beyond the control and scope
of developing countries. Looking at aggregate FDI and portfolio investment over
time, one can also see distinct differences in the pattern over the last 20 years (
Appendix #1). This becomes an important concern in the event of a significant
reversal of these flows. A reversal of flows due to domestic factors can be
controlled for by the host country, however if there is a reversal of capital
inflows due to factors beyond the scope of the host country, then this could lead
to a crisis situation like that of Mexico. Thus, the mix of capital flows to
developing countries becomes an important issue, especially when PFI and FDI
flows are each influenced by separate factors, and can lead to drastic effects in
the event of a reversal of flows.
Literature Review:

Several authors have attempted to assess the role played by domestic and
international factors in capital flows to developing countries.
i) Calvo and others (1993), study capital flows in ten Latin American
countries, and using monthly data, they find that interest rates and the
recession in developed countries account for a lot of the variability in the
these flows.
ii) Fernandez-Arias (1994) uses quarterly data on portfolio flows and
concludes that 86% of the increase in flows since 1989 is due to a fall in
international interest rates. However, both these authors ignore the
relevance of domestic factors in determining capital inflows.
iii) Chuhan and others (1993), try to measure the significance of domestic
factors, the independent variables they use, as proxies for domestic
factors, are not under the control of the host country' government.

II

iv) Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1991), analyze data on components of
capital flows in five industrial countries and in five developed countries.
It investigates whether volatility and persistence match up with categories

of capital flows as expected, and whether the data reveals systemic
relationships between the flows. They conclude from examining timeseries data long-term flows (FDI) are as volatile as short-term flows (PFI),
they take equally long to recover from shocks.
The above studies do not account for domestic factors as playing an
important role in private capital flows. The first three studies only deal mainly
with portfolio flows, ignoring the FDI component of capital flows, thus they do
not account for differences in composition of the flows. Also, they fail to include
in their sample countries that have not received substantial capital inflows in the
recent years, which could definitely lead to a sample bias. While Claessens,
Dooley and Warner examine both flows, the focus of their paper is mainly the
examination of the volatility of the flows, and doesn't really address what
motivates the flows.
v) Hernandez and Rudolph (1994), deals with the question of reversibility
of the recent surge in capital flows. The paper considers both domestic
and international factors in determining capital flows to developing
countries. In fact their results show that domestic factors such as domestic
investment and domestic savings rate playa significant role in explaining
the recent surge in capital inflows. Therefore, countries that implement
domestic reforms will continue to receive large amounts of flows, despite
increases in interest rates. The problem with their study, is that they do
not account for differences in the nature of different forms of capital
flows. Although they include FDI in some of their regressions, they do
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not estimate a separate model for FDI, thus their conclusions are based on
the assumption that all capital flows are based on the same factors.
The studies above have provided me with an understanding of some of
the empirical research 0 the subject. I plan to address the issue in a slightly
different way. I plan to estimate two different structural models for FDI and PFI,
because I believe from my research that these two flows are motivated by very
different factors. As a result, I will then be able to better explain what drives
different capital flows, accounting for the compositional differences of these
flows by country, considering domestic as well as international factors.

Estimation of Model:

Model I: An Estimation of Foreign Direct Investment
In order to estimate a model of FDI, one must examine the factors that motivate a
corporation's decision to invest in a country. MNC's consider a variety of factors
when deciding whether or not to invest.
1) Size of the economy:

Large markets imply large purchasing power, which is a large incentives to
firms that are looking at investments intended exclusively for the domestic
market, or investments that require a large and strong market base for export
production. A high level of economic development also implies better domestic
infrastructure facilities and developed capital markets. One of the primary
reasons for a firm in Taiwan to engage in FDI, was to expand their market
ls

base. Per capita GDP, with a one year lag is able to capture the opportunities
available to investors in a developing country that has a large market.
18 Tain-Jy Chen, "Determinants of Taiwan's Foreign Direct Investment", Journal of Development
Economics,
Volume 39, 1992: 397-407
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2) Growth rate of the economy:

The rate at which the economy is growing, also has a significant effect on a
firm's decision to invest. The argument behind this is that a rapidly growing
economy provides more profit opportunities than an economy that is "inching"
along. 19 An economy that is growing fast also may be experiencing liberalization
of government policies and reduced bureaucratic delays. The growth rate can be
measured by the annual change in per capita GOP, with a one year lag, which
indicates the attractiveness of a growing region to foreign investors.
3) Variation of the Exchange Rate:

The deviation of the exchange rate from its mean, reflects volatility and
uncertainty of government policies and regulations. Thus, in some sense the
variation of the exchange rate provided us with a good measure of political risk,
even though it may not directly affect the firms profits. With risk averse
investors, a high degree of risk associated with the host country's government is
likely to make investing in the country highly unattractive. This is expected to
have a negative coefficient.
4)Leve/ of Exports:

The level of exports provides us with a measure of the degree of openness of the
economy. It reflects the nature of their regulations, tariffs and barriers, and
demonstrates how liberal the host government's policies are. It is an indicator of
both the capacity of the domestic economy to compete with the rest of the world,
and of the development of the tradable sector within the economy. Also, for a
firm that is looking for a strong base for production that is export oriented, a
high level of exports indicates increasing access to other countries and a large
market for their products. This indicates a country's repayment capacity and is
expected to have a positive coefficient.
19

Roger Riddell and Lawrence Cockcroft, Foreign Direct Investment, (New York: Praeger, 1991)
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5) Country Dummies:

These dummy variables are included in the regression to account for fixed
effects factors. This means that a significant portion of FDI maybe explained by
differences in the various host countries. There is a very diverse group of
countries in my sample, and the dummy variables are intended to capture this
effect.
Taking into account, these determinants of FDI, one can estimate a model that
predicts FDI in developing countries over a certain period of time.

FDI/GDPit

al +

a2~GDP

it-l + wDXR it + <X4EX/GDP it +

mAR +a6BR + a7CH + asIN + a9RK + alOMA +
an ME + U12NI + a13PA + a14PH
FDI/GDP it- Net level of FDI in country i, at time t, deflated by GDP
L':.GDP it - Annual rate of change of GDP, lagged by one year

DXR it - Variation of the exchange rate about its mean.
EX/GDPit - Level of exports/GDP
AR-

Country dummy for Argentina

MA- Country dummy for Malaysia

BR-

Country dummy for Brazil

ME-

Country dummy for Mexico

CH-

Country dummy for Chile

NI-

Country dummy for Nigeria

IN-

Country dummy for Indonesia

PA-

Country dummy for Pakistan

RK- Country dummy for Rep. of Korea PH-

Country dummy for Philippines

15

Model II: An Estimation of Portfolio Investment
There are a number of factors that determine international portfolio investment.
1) International Interest rates:

A risk-free international interest rates is one of the most important external
variables that could have an affect on PFI. The international interest rate matters
for two reasons:
a) An increase in the level of the international interest rate increases the cost of
investing in developing countries, especially for portfolio investors who are
mainly driven by profit. If international interest rates rise, then investors can
earn higher profits with less risk, as a result they are likely not to invest in
developing countries.
b) Also, increases in the international interest rates would raise the total debt
service obligation of indebted developing countries, and thereby increase their
risk of default, which is likely to drive away foreign investors. Therefore, it can
also be considered a proxy for the creditworthiness of the host country. Thus,
considering the above factors, one expects the coefficient to have a negative sign.
2)Rate of return:

This is a measure of the domestic rate of return in the host country. This
incorporates domestic interest rates and depreciation of the country's exchange
rate.
RR= i( host country's interest rate) - (rate of depreciation)
i - {(St-St+l)/St+l}
This represent the actual rate of return that foreign investors would obtain in
their own currency if they were to invest in the country, as it incorporates a
depreciation of the exchange rate which is measured as [ St = Ratio of domestic
currency to the US$, e.g. in the case of Mexico it would be pesos/1US$j. 1t is
expected to have a positive sign.

16

5) Country Dummies:

These dummy variables are included in the regression to account for fixed
effects factors. This means that a significant portion of FDI maybe explained by
differences in the various host countries. There is a very diverse group of
countries in my sample, and the dummy variables are intended to capture this
effect.
With the above arguments in mind, we can estimate an equation.

PF / GDP it =

~l

+ ~2I it + ~3 RR it + ~4AR + ~5BR + ~6CH +

~8RK

~7IN

+

+ ~9MA + ~lOME + ~l1NI + ~12PA + ~13PH

PF /GDP it - Net portfolio investment in time t, in country i
I it - International risk-free interest rate( 6 month US treasury bill rate)
RR it - Rate of return in host country: i it - [( St - St-l)/ St)

AR-

Country dummy for Argentina

MA- Country dummy for Malaysia

BR-

Country dummy for Brazil

ME-

Country dummy for Mexico

CH-

Country dummy for Chile

NI-

Country dummy for Nigeria

It'\[-

Country dummy for Indonesia

P A-

Country dummy for Pakistan

RK- Country dummy for Rep. of Korea PH-

Country dummy for Philippines

Regression Analysis and Results:
The two empirical models were tested on a group of 11 countries, which
are listed in the data description at the end. Each country has a single
observation for each explanatory variable over the years 1980-1992, amounting
to a total of 143 observations.
Each model was tested using an Ordinary Least Squares Estimation. The DurbinWatson tests revealed that, at the 5% level, serial correlation was not present in
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any of the regressions. The results for the dependent variables FDI and PFI are
reported in Tables 2 and 3. All the regression results are reported in these two
tables.
Foreign Direct Investment:
2

The regression as a whole is significant as the R

=.. 604. This indicates that

the explanatory variables explain a significant proportion of FDI. The variables
in this model include: annu.al change in GDP, level of exports deflated by GDP,
deviation of the exchange rate and dummy variables for each country. The
dummy variables were intended to control for exogenous differences in each
country. The dummy variables for each country are consistently significant at the
5% level in this regression, which indicates that there are regional differences
that account for a significant proportion of FDI. The annual change in GDP was
included a growth rate measure intended to measure the attractiveness of a
growing region to investors. This is significant at the 5% level with a positive
sign, which conforms to my expectations that a country that is growing fast will
attract more FDI than one that is growing slowly. The level of exports deflated
by GDP, provides a measure of the openness of the economy, and is also
significant at the 5% level with a positive sign. This indicates that countries that
have progressive policies, relatively open borders and fewer tariffs and quotas
on trade, are likely to have more of an inflow of FDI. The deviation of the
exchange rate which is measured by the deviation of the nominal exchange rate
from its mean, is significant at the 10% level with a negative sign. It is not
significant at the 5% level, which indicates that it does not have as much of an
impact on FDI as the other variables mentioned above. While I originally
included GDP per capita as a measure of market size, it lost it's significance once
I included dummy variables for each country, which indicates the two variables
have very similar effects on FDI. ( results: table 4). Also the variable that
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represents deviation of the exchange rate became much less significant, this may
be because the exchange rate variable is a kind of proxy for political risk of the
host country, since this is very similar to the effect of the GDP per capita
variable. Since GDP is very different for each country, it does not vary much
over time, and so it basically functions as a dummy variable for each country, so
I left it out of the equation. The significant dummy variables indicate that the
country differences play an important role in determining FDI. The US interest
rate variable was not at all significant in this regression ( results: table 5).
Thus, this leads me to conclude that the factors that drive FDI that are mainly
domestic. FDI is determined by the growth rate of a country, the level of exports,
the deviation of the exchange rate and also the specific country itself. A decision
to become a foreign direct investor in a country is a carefully thought out
procedure, that takes into account the condition of the host country's economy,
the political risk, and the national differences among countries. The factors that
influence FDI are to a large extent within the control of the host government, and
in the event of a possible reversal of flows, the host government can control for it
and maybe even prevent it from occurring by changing their poliCies towards
the factors discussed above.

Portfolio Investment:
The regression as a whole is not very significant as the R2= .108. This
could be due to the fact that the variance of portfolio investment is so high, that
it is relatively hard to predict and explain a large portion of it. Even though I
was unable to explain a large part of PFI, the regression results in Table 3, still
provide us with a good idea of what mainly drives PFI. The variables included
in this regression are international interest rate and a measure of the domestic
rate of return for the host country and dummy variables to account for
exogenous national differences. The dummy variables for each country are not
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significant. This shows us that portfolio investors are not very concerned with
national differences and do not distinguish between the countries they invest in
based on country specific factors. The coefficient on US treasury bills is
significant at the 5% level, and has a positive sign. This conforms to expected
ideas that portfolio investment is highly dependent on international interest
rates. If international interest rate were to increase then portfolio investors
would not invest in developing countries at all. The other variable that is not
significant is the domestic rate of return of the host country. This could be due to
the fact that this variable in itself maybe hard to measure accurately and
therefore may not show the desired results. Variables that measure a change in
GDP and level of exports are not at all significant in this regression, and can be
eliminated as determinants of PFI.
Thus, one can conclude that PFI is mainly driven by factors that are beyond the
host government's control, such as international interest rates. If US interest rates
increase, then there will probably be a large reversal of portfolio flows, which
cannot be prevented by the host economy.

Conclusions:
Previous research on this subject led to a variety of conclusions as to what
motivates capital flows to developing countries. My empirical results indicate
that FDI and PFI flows are driven by different factors. While FDI is mainly
driven by domestic (pull) factors, whereas PFI is mainly driven by external
(push) factors. this becomes an extremely important issue when one deals with a
country where the capital inflows are composed mainly of one form of
investment, i.e. countries with large amounts of FDI or PFI ( not a balanced mix
of the two). If the country is mainly financed by FDI then it still has a great
extent of control over the flows and can prevent outflows by changing policies
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towards variables such as amount of exports, or keeping its exchange rate stable
around the mean. On the other hand, if a country is financed mainly through
portfolio investment, then it is unlikely that the country will be able to stop
significant outflows, but still might be able to prevent a crisis( like the Mexican
crisis of 1994) by keeping high amounts of foreign exchange reserves, or
instituting certain kinds of capital controls to discourage PFI flows and try to
attract more FDI flows.
While my work throws some light on the issue of FDI and PFI flows, further
research could be carried out to try and come up with a better model and a
better estimation of PFI.
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DATA:

I have used annual capital flows data for 11 developing countries for a period of
13 years, from 1980-1992. The sample mainly consists of countries that are
identified today as emerging markets.

Countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines and Turkey.

Data Sources:
The data on levels of GDP, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, level
of exports and annual change in GDP were all obtained from the World Bank's
World Data CD-ROM. The real exchange rate index was obtained from J.P.
Morgan's Trade Weighted Index of Exchange Rates for Emerging Markets. The
data on international and domestic interest rates was obtained from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Data on financial flows, composition of capital
flows is from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System.
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Foreign direct investment(FDI) portfolio invetsment(PFI) flows to sample countries.
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Appendix #2
Table 1.1
Total Private Capital flows by country (annual average)

Country

Total Private capital flows

As a % of

US$ billions ( Annual Avg.)

1992 GNP

Argentina

5415.7

2.4

Brazil

5827.6

1.5

Chile

1637.6

4.2

Indonesia

3717.1

3

Rep. of Korea

6571.9

2.2

Malaysia

4112.4

7.5

Mexico

11793.5

3.7

Nigeria

109.3

0.4

Pakistan

213.7

0.4

Philippines

1413.3

2.6

Turkey

3459.2

3.2

Source: The World Bank Debtor Reporting System

Table 1.2
Aggregate net resource flows to all developing countries: 1986-1992
US $ billions

Year

Official

Private

Loans

Loans

FDI

PFI

1986

35.4

11.7

12.9

0.8

1987

31.7

10

16.9

0.8

1988

24.6

12

23.2

1.2

1989

23.4

12.7

25.7

3.5

1990

29.2

15

26.7

3.8

1991

29.2

18.5

36.8

7.6

1992

20.4

41.4

47.1

14.2

Source: The World Bank, Debt Reporting System. World Debt Tables 1993-1994
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Table 2:
Results for Foreign Direct Investment
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.777385527

R Square

0.604328257

Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.56445436
0.010273142
143

Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct InvestmenY GOP

Indeeendent Variables
Intercept

Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

-2.467590501

0.014913

-0.015803364

0.006404371

Annual Change in GDP (%) *

0.000424471

0.000212887

1.993880344 0.048274

Exports/GDP *

0.058678989

0.018367546

3.194710376

Deviation of the exchange rate **

-3.02373E-05

1.63978E-05

-1.843990204 0.067479

Dummy for Argentina

0.020015509

0.005702896

3.509709375 0.000618

Dummy for Brazil

0.014126436

0.005633988

2.507359926 0.013405

Dummy for Chile

0.008235499

0.004031706

2.042683486 0.043121

Dummy for Indonesia

0.005839125

0.004228326

1.380954169 0.169681

-0.008200085

0.004233832

-1.93679994 0.054956

Dummy for Malaysia

0.021329166

0.006828578

3.123514934 0.002207

Dummy for Mexico

0.020463541

0.004728012

4.328148988

Dummy for Nigeria

0.013364916

0.004051054

3.299120819 0.001254

Dummy for Pakistan

0.009686237

0.005216027

1.857014418

Dummy for Philippines

0.006447093

0.004121796

1.564146667 0.120233

Dummy for Rep. of Korea

*

Significant at the 5% level

**

Significant at the 10% level

iv

0.00176

2.99E-05

0.06559

Table 3
Results for Portfolio Investment
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.32932649

R Square

0.10845594

Adjusted R Square

0.02615956

Standard Error
Observations

0.0157961
143

Dependent Variable: Portfolio Investment/GOP

Indeeendent Variables

Coefficients Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

Intercept

0.01459393

0.005849777

2.494783333

0.013856786

Domestic rate of return

8.6076E-07

8.31721 E-07

1.034919626

0.302627783

6 month US Treasury bill rate'

-0.0009569

0.000479601

-1.9951382

0.048118646

Dummy for Argentina

-0.0048363

0.006338759

-0.7629765

0.446864926

Dummy for Brazil

-0.0038318

0.006323286 -0.605978735

0.545585483

Dummy for Chile

0.00615679

0.006195742

0.99371359

0.322208354

Dummy for Indonesia

-0.0061255

0.006195743 -0.988662763

0.324664745

Dummy for Rep. of Korea

-0.0017901

0.006195751 -0.288921215

0.773101882

Dummy for Malaysia

0.00536838

0.006195758

0.866460595

0.387834

Dummy for Mexico

0.00085942

0.006195748

0.138711332

0.889892907

Dummy for Nigeria

0.0050071

0.006195752

0.808150266

0.420480464

Dummy for Pakistan

-0.0048446

0.00619575 -0.781929179

0.435678039

Dummy for Philippines

-0.0058728

0.006195747

, Significant at the 5% level

v

-0.94787105

0.344953769

Table 4

Table 4
Foreign Direct Invesment ( with GDP per capita as an independent variable)
Regression Statistics

Multiple R

0.8069354

R Square

0.6511447

Adjusted R Square

0.6099413

Standard Error

0.0097219

Observations

Indeeendent Va riables

143

Coefficients Stanciarq Error

t Stat

P-value

Intercept

-0.0200496

0.006325755

-3.169516398 0.001913671

GDP per capita

-8.054E-07

3.04384E-06

-0.264611547 0.791737685

Annual Change in GDP (%) *

0.0005331

0.000209926

2.539287931 0.012314459

Exports/GDP *

0.0762886

0.019033891

4.008040772 0.000103716

Deviation of the exchange rate **

7.548E-06

1.80227E-05

0.418808316

Dummy for Argentina

0.0257336

0.010020944

2.567981433 0.011387202

Dummy for Brazil

0.0189824

0.006585255

2.882559388 0.004633578

Dummy for Chile

0.0179419

0.004685674

3.829087463 0.000201021

Dummy for Indonesia

0.0186353

0.005453833

3.416924873 0.000851297

-0.0082991

0.0062607

-1.32558051 0.187358234

Dummy for Malaysia

0.0261494

0.006576276

3.976320148 0.000116799

Dummy for Mexico

0.0286229

0.005719728

5.004243123 1.82777E-06

Dummy for Nigeria

0.039085

0.007746568

5.045463825 1.52809E-06

Dummy for Pakistan

0.0113818

0.005244526

2.170225575

Dummy for Philippines

0.0077071

0.004169243

1.848572184 0.066845397

Dummy for Rep. of Korea

*

Significant at the 5% level

**

Significant at the 10% level

vi

0.67606367

0.03185043

Table 5

Table 5
Foreign Direct Invesment ( with GDP per capita as an independent variable)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.778450526

R Square

0.605985222

Adjusted R Square

0.562889856

Standard Error

0.010291576

Observations

Indeeendent Variables

143

Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

Intercept

-0.011805312

0.008417748

-1.402431176 0.163207203

US Treasury bill

-0.000275034

0.000374871

-0.733677861 0.464486796

Annual Change in GDP (%) •

0.000447503

0.000215567

2.07593746 0.039901232

Exports/GDP'

0.052653264

0.020150251

2.61303266

Deviation of the exchange rate ••

-2.5069E-05

1.78739E-05

-1.402547969 0.163172424

Dummy for Argentina

0.018779035

0.005956519

3.152686149 0.002015552

Dummy for Brazil

0.012872072

0.005897363

2.182682858 0.030883881

Dummy for Chile

0.008214618

0.004039041

2.033804334 0.044038021

Dummy for Indonesia

0.005400614

0.004277873

1.262453071 0.209081033

-0.007964753

0.00425354

-1.87249966 0.063418984

Dummy for Malaysia

0.023076359

0.007243488

3.18580742 0.001813602

Dummy for Mexico

0.019677761

0.004856075

4.052194377 8.74664E-05

Dummy for Nigeria

0.013383443

0.004058402

3.297712675 0.001262112

Dummy for Pakistan

0.008564202

0.005444586

1.572975883 0.118192991

Dummy for Philippines

0.006239726

0.004138854

1.507597468 0.134121759

Dummy for Rep. of Korea

•

Significant at the 5% level

--

Significant at the 10% level

vii

0.01004875

Table 6

Table 6: Portfolio Investment including domestic macroeconomic variables
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.445295001

R Square

0.198287638

Adjusted R Square

0.103597202

Standard Error

0.015155058

Observations

Indeeendent Variables

143

Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

Intercept

0.049319658

0.012981128 3.7993354 0.0002239

Domestic rate of return

1.02099E-06

8.20492E-07

1.244358 0.2156594

US treasury rates

-0.00161914

0.000521457

-3.105033 0.0023466

GDP per capita

5.37974E-06

4.74231 E-06

1.1344118 0.2587585

-0.000126392

0.000324425

-0.389588

0.697494

7.65217E-07

7.94634E-07

0.962981

0.3373587

Dummy for Argentina

-0.042331331

0.015291071

-2.768369 0.0064775

Dummy for Brazil

-0.032758696

0.010272329

-3.189023 0.0017981

Dummy for Chile

0.003589843

Annual Change in GDP (%)
Exports/GDP

0.006331813 0.5669535 0.5717465

Dummy for Indonesia

-0.009276904

0.007063671

-1.313326 0.1914409

Dummy for Rep. of Korea

-0.004671651

0.010027864

-0.465867 0.6421087

Dummy for Malaysia

0.035485064

0.010769945 3.2948232 0.0012766

Dummy for Mexico

-0.018355875

0.008342566

-2.200267 0.0295966

Dummy for Nigeria

0.008913223

0.007240352

1.2310483 0.2205797

Dummy for Pakistan

-0.019953867

0.008563131

-2.330207 0.0213723

Dummy for Philippines

-0.007812852

0.006587156

-1.186074 0.2378075

•

Significant at the 5% level

••

Significant at the 10% level
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Table 7:
I
-- ..
Foreign Direct Investment with US Treasury bill rate and domestic macro variables
. --_.

-

Regression Statistics

Multiple R

-

.-

_ ._.

---

-

.

--

0.778450526

-

.R Square

0.605985222

Adjusted R Square

0.562889856

Standard Error

--- , -

--

-

~

. -

-

-_._-_ ...

- . ..-

0.010291576

Observations

143

..

-

- -_ .•. _.. .. _.

.._-

,

Coefficients

Independent Variables

Intercept
US Treasury bill

Standard Error

P-value

t Stat

....•.-

-0.011805312

0.008417748

-1.402431176 0.163207203

-0.000275034

0.000374871

-0.733677861 0.464486796

0.000447503

0.000215567

2.07593746 0.039901232

0.052653264

0.020150251

0.01004875

-2.5069E-05

0.012872072

1.78739E-05 . - -1 .402547969 0.163_1724241 .. _ 0.005956519
3.152686149 ._0.002015: t ' = ..2.182682858 0.030883881
_
0.005897363

0.008214618

0.004039041

2.033804334 0.044038021

0.005400614

0.004277873

1.262453071
0.209081033
" "-". ,, .'.- .

-0.007964753

0.00425354

-1.87249966 0.063418984

Dummy for Mala)lsia"

0.023076359

0.007243488

Dummy for Mexico"

0.019677761

0.004856075

3.18580742 0.001813602
.
-.
4.052194377

~rr1my for Nigeria"

0.013383443

0.004058402

3.297712675 0.001262112

Dummy for Paki.stan

0.008564202

0.005444586

1.572975883 _0.;18192991

Dummy for Philippines

0.006239726

0.004138854

1.507597468 0.134121759

Annual Change in GDP (%) ,
E.~e'?rts/GDP

,

Deviation
_._
- of the exchange
- rate
Dummy for Argentina'

.-

Dumm}' for Brazil"
Q!Jmmy for Chile"

-..•

Dumm}' for Indonesia

-

Qumm)l for Ree. of Korea

-.
"

Significant at the 5% level

""

Significant at the 10% level
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